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In his contribution to this Special Issue, Clive Barnett takes a
critical view of certain developments in radical democratic theory,
reminding his readers towards the end of his article, of the impor-
tance of ‘situated contexts’ of political action (Barnett, 2012, p. xx).
Instead of those theories of ‘the political’ which implicitly disre-
gard the empirical in favor of supposedly ‘more fundamental struc-
tures of existence’, he calls for a kind of theory which can
supplement speciﬁc accounts of ‘particular struggles, injustices
and compromises’ (Barnett, 2012, p. xx). He describes such
accounts, adopting a phrase from the anthropologist Julia Paley,
as ‘ethnographically emergent’ (Barnett, 2012, p. xx).
In a late review of the sweep of politics in places he had written
about earlier in his career, Clifford Geertz made some oddly sym-
metrical comments on the place of political theory. Political theory,
he says,
Presents itself as addressing universal and abiding matters con-
cerning power, obligation, justice, and government in general
and unconditioned terms, the truth about things as at bottom
they always and everywhere necessarily are, is in fact, and inev-
itably a speciﬁc response to immediate circumstances. However
cosmopolitan it may be in intent, it is, like religion, literature,
historiography, or law, driven and animated by the demands
of the moment: a guide to perplexities particular, pressing,
local, and at hand (Geertz, 2000, p. 218).Y-NC-ND license. What makes these comments symmetrical, is the fact that both
highlight the relationship between theory-in-general and politics-
in-any-particular-location. They are symmetrical but not at all
identical. For Barnett, theory-in-general, if it is to be of any use,
has among other things, to be ready to deal with the contingencies
of those local circumstances which shape the form in which con-
testation or legitimacy, agonism or solidarity, ﬁnd their particular
force. For Geertz, though, theory-in-general is a chimera, a set of
abstractions which are much more tightly bound to the immediate
political circumstances of their production than their authors will
ever acknowledge.
This article hovers uncertainly in the space between these two
positions. As an anthropologist I ﬁnd myself naturally siding with
Geertz and his suspicion of the political view from nowhere. But
in my own speciﬁc projects I found an unexpected afﬁnity between
local perceptions of the political and precisely those theoretical
positions Barnett chides for their inattention to empirical process.
In this paper I do two things, using material from two temporally
distant research projects in Sri Lanka. One is to revisit an argument
about the political as a theoretical problem, in my case at least a
problem for anthropology. The other is to ask questions about
the boundaries of the political, about the work that goes into the
partial and always incomplete effort to bound off areas of life as
being properly ‘outside’ the political. My examples will concern
the boundary between politics and religion and my setting is Sri
Lanka where I have worked on and off since 1981.
In the early 1980s I spent 2 years doing ostensibly ‘normal’
ﬁeldwork in what became increasingly abnormal times. The result
was a monograph about the local roots of nationalist attachments,
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argument for that book always struck me as unresolved in certain
respects and two decades later I published another shorter book,
Anthropology, Politics and the State (Spencer, 2007), which revisited
the idea of the ‘political’ as a distinctive kind of problem for both
anthropologists, and the people they write about. My resolution
of my earlier problem depended heavily in the end on Schmitt’s
(1996 [1932]) deﬁnition of the political as fundamentally based
on the distinction between friend and enemy. My path to Schmitt
was mediated by the somewhat friendlier ﬁgure of Chantal Mouffe
(2000). I will recapitulate some of this path a little later in the pa-
per. The second project I draw on is, by contrast, so fresh it is still
being analyzed. This is a 2-year project on the role of religious
organizations in the conﬂict in Eastern Sri Lanka.1 What links the
two is a set of questions which are close to the heart of this Special
Issue. How do people attempt to bound the workings of the political?
How is the political, in the speciﬁcally agonistic sense intended by
Schmitt, productive of community or solidarity? Is it possible to step
outside the political? Does religion in particular offer a privileged
ground from which to offer a critique of the political?
The paper that follows moves between speciﬁc scenes from dif-
ferent ﬁeldwork locations, some more general background on the
fraught history of mass politics and religion in Sri Lanka, and some
more general discussion of issues of community and the political.
The scenes in question are a desultory political rally in a village
during the Presidential election campaign of 1982, and a meeting
with members of a Mosque Federation Committee in the town of
Kattankudy in Eastern Sri Lanka in 2008. Between 1982 and
2008, Sri Lankan experienced almost three decades of civil war,
now apparently ended by the government’s decisive military vic-
tory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in May 2009.2. Scene 1: 11 October 1982
Sri Lanka is in the midst of its ﬁrst ever direct election for the
position of President. In bringing the election forward, the incum-
bent, J.R. Jayewardene of the UNP [United National Party], has ini-
tiated the ﬁrst of a series of constitutional tricks aimed at
consolidating his hold on power for as long as possible. The main
opposition leader, Mrs. Bandaranaike, cannot play a role in the
election as she has had her civil rights removed by Jayawardene
earlier in his period of ofﬁce. Her party are demoralized and no
one expects them to oust Jayewardene this time around. In the
morning I travel to a village a few miles away to attend a rally
for the ruling UNP. The main attraction is the rising star of Jaye-
wardene’s government, Gamini Dissanayake, who is scheduled to
arrive by helicopter for the rally. I am struck by the amount of gold
jewellery he and his PA are sporting. The crowd seem at least as
impressed by the helicopter as they are by the politicians in it.
The afternoon’s event is a rather stark contrast. By now it has
started to rain quite heavily and the small crowd that has gathered
in one of the house compounds to hear from local SLFP [Sri Lanka
Freedom Party] leaders is huddling under whatever shelter it can
ﬁnd. One of the speakers is a well-known local Buddhist monk, a
ﬁery nationalist who has a special animus for the local UNP MP1 The project is entitled ‘Conﬂict, Community and Faith: The Politics of Public
Action in Sri Lanka’ and was funded as part of the ESRC research programme ‘Non-
Governmental Public Action’. Much of the work of the project is still being written up
(Spencer et al., in preparation) but see Goodhand et al. (2009) and Hasbullah and Korf
(forthcoming) for some further detail and analysis. The project involved a collabo-
rative ethnography led by a team of 6 (Jonathan Goodhand, Shahul Hasbullah, Bart
Klem, Benedikt Korf, Tudor Silva, Jonathan Spencer), supplemented by junior
colleagues from Peradeniya, Eastern and Southeastern Universities. Fieldwork was
carried out in Batticaloa and Ampara Districts in Eastern Sri Lanka between 2006 and
2008. Fieldwork in 1981–1983 was carried out in Sabaragamuva Province by Spencer,
supported by the then UK Social Science Research Council (now the ESRC).who is, in this predominantly Sinhala Buddhist area, himself a
Muslim. Just as the crowd is beginning to warm up at the prospect
of an appearance fromMrs. Bandaranaike’s brother (the former MP
for the area), the meeting is disrupted. Two prominent village lead-
ers of the UNP appear in the road below the compound and start
shouting abuse. They have been drinking steadily since the morn-
ing rally.
There follows a scene of mounting dissonance. As the speakers
plough on through the heckling, the two drunks get angrier and an-
grier. When a new speaker starts to criticize the government for
neglecting villages like this one, they shout back ‘What about the
school we built? The drinking water pipe?’ Eventually the lead ﬁg-
ure crashes into the compound and starts to wave his ﬁnger in the
face of the speaker and shout at him. Before he can do that, though,
he notices the monk and stops in mid-harangue to offer the cus-
tomary bow of respect that all Buddhists offer all monks. It does
not really work and the monk too starts shouting at him. Registers
become hopelessly tangled – it is simply not done to shout at a
monk, just as a monk should not abandon decorum and shout at
anyone else – and the meeting collapses in chaos.23. Scene 2: 4 November 2008
Kattankudy is a Muslim town in Eastern Sri Lanka. Indeed it
prides itself on being the most Muslim town in all of Sri Lanka,
as well, not uncoincidentally, as being the most densely populated
urban space on the island.3 As the war between the Sinhala domi-
nated government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam [LTTE]
has swept back and forth across this region, so more and more Mus-
lims have packed into their town, surrounded on all sides by sea, la-
goon and – Tamils. I am no longer the heroic (but miserable) lone
ethnographer I was in the 1980s. I am here with my colleagues Bart
Klem and Shahul Hasbullah. Hasbullah, a geographer from the Uni-
versity of Peradeniya, has been working on a case study of Kat-
tankudy for our project on religion and conﬂict. It is a very good
site for the topic. The day Hasbullah and I ﬁrst drove through the
town together on a brief ﬁeld trip 2 years earlier had seen the at-
tempted burial of an allegedly heterodox Suﬁ leader, who had died
in Colombo. His body was immediately exhumed by other Muslims,
and in the violence that followed three people were killed and a
number of buildings attacked. Religion and conﬂict indeed.
Most of our short visit has been organized with the help of the
Kattankudy Federation of Mosques and Muslim Institutions, and
the tour of key sites around the town tells a tale of conﬂict in many
dimensions. The centre-piece is one of the town’s biggest mosques,
the site of an attack by the LTTE at Friday prayers in 1990 in which
103 men and boys were massacred. Their names are listed on a
board outside the prayer-hall itself, every bullet hole and gash in
the plaster preserved exactly is it was left that day. We also pass
another mosque where grenades had been thrown a month or
two earlier – allegedly by the splinter group from the LTTE, the
TMVP, which now poses as the political face of the government’s
post-conﬂict ‘awakening’ of the East.4 But we also see evidence of
another rather different conﬂict – the half-smashed remains of an
impressive religious structure, the headquarters of a radical Suﬁ
movement which was attacked by its religious opponents from2 The context for this rather terse vignette, including the broader story of national
political developments in the 1970s and 1980s, can be found in Spencer (1990).
3 In Sri Lanka, Muslims are the ‘‘other’ minority, Tamil-speakers but not considered
‘‘ethnically’’ Tamil, caught up in the conﬂict but as likely to be attacked by Tamil
separatists as by anyone else. For good critical introductions to what is obviously a
long story see Ismail (1995), McGilvray (2008), and Klem (2011). For a stronger sense
of the immediate political context see Spencer (2010).
4 TMVP stands for Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, the name taken for what had
previously been known simply as the ‘Karuna group’ (after its erstwhile leader Karuna
who before the split was LTTE commander in the East).
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has been hauled to the ground, its concrete trunk snapped like a tree
downed by a storm.
The highlight of the tour, though, is not this impressive evi-
dence of a landscape marked by the enduring signs of 30 years of
violent conﬂict. It is, in another stark contrast, a display of rather
impressive unity and community, an apparent textbook case of
that elusive chimera of development policy-makers, local civil
society at its most civil. In the evening we have been invited to
meet an informal gathering of members of the Mosque Federation.
The meeting is in the Federation’s impressive new ofﬁce building
in the centre of town. Little by little a group of about ‘15:20’ joins
us. On this occasion all are men. They are a mixture of weighty lo-
cal ﬁgures, like a recently retired senior civil servant who has
moved back to Kattankudy from Colombo. Others represent partic-
ular organizations like the Islamist group Jamaat-i-Islami. And oth-
ers speak from positions in what we might call ‘‘ofﬁcial’’ civil
society, such as the highly articulate local ofﬁcial from the Muslim
Peace Secretariat, a body established in the wake of the now aban-
doned 2002 ceaseﬁre between the government and the LTTE. Our
discussion is mostly in English with some improvized translation
back and forth into Tamil. We learn a great deal about the activities
of the Federation and its history. The history, like other Mosque
Federations in this part of Sri Lanka, is rather precisely coeval with
the history of the ethnic conﬂict. It was founded in 1985, the year
when relations between neighboring Muslim and Tamil groups in
Eastern Sri Lanka ﬁrst descended into violent confrontation, and
it has grown from strength to strength with each twist and turn
in the subsequent years of conﬂict. We are told about the many
organizations, from sports clubs to cultural groups, as well as mos-
ques and religious organizations, that have afﬁliated to the federa-
tion, how the federation’s affairs are conducted through weekly
meetings, to which all afﬁliates are invited to send a representa-
tive, of the federation’s work to abolish dowry, to reform zakat
(the Muslim tithe gathered at the end of Ramadan each year) in
the town so that resources can be pooled for local development ini-
tiatives, to keep undesirable inﬂuences (video shops and liquor
stores for example) out of the town.
It is all very impressive and worthy of a great deal more
documentation and reﬂection than I am going to offer on this occa-
sion.5 What I want to do is focus more tightly on two contradictory
remarks that came at the start and end of our discussion. Early in the
proceedings, while everyone is taking stock of this unfamiliar group
of visitors, we get something like the ‘‘ofﬁcial’ view of the relation-
ship between the Mosque Federation and local politicians. Every-
thing in Kattankudy, we are told, happens through the Mosque
Federation; local Muslim politicians, for example, always come ﬁrst
to the Mosque Federation before deciding what they are going to do
or say on particular issues. Two hours later, by which time the con-
versation is ﬂowing more freely and everyone is more relaxed about
who we are and what we are trying to do in our research, we revisit
this question of the relationship between the Federation and the pol-
iticians. This time the answer is rather different. The reason we have
the capacity we do have, we are told, what gives us our authority
within the community, is that we keep the politicians completely
out of everything we do. If they were to get involved in our internal
affairs, that would be the end.
4. Religion and the political in Sri Lanka
These examples cry out for a fuller sense of context. In particu-
lar I need to sketch in some sense of the shifting and unstable5 It goes without saying that what I do know about this arresting case I owe to the
ﬁeldwork skills of my colleague Dr. S. Hasbullah. More detail on the case can be found
in Hasbullah and Korf (forthcoming).relationship between politics and religion in Sri Lanka.6 The picture
is complex, and not well illuminated by too early recourse to simpli-
fying concepts like ‘secularism’.
Let me start with the ﬁrst scene, the shouting match between
the monk and the drunken local party boss. At that point in the
modern political history of Sri Lanka a kind of modus vivendi had
been established in the long history of Buddhism and politics on
the island. From the early 1940s on, in other words within a decade
of the ﬁrst mass elections on the island, one vociferous group of
Buddhist monks had been calling for the right to participate in na-
tional politics. Right wing politicians, including a younger J.R. Jaye-
wardene, opposed them, but to little avail. In 1956 younger monks
played a key role in the election of a populist socialist-nationalist
coalition led by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike. The central issue was the
proposal to make Sinhala the sole national language, and thus to
dislodge the privilege of the ruling political and social elite. That
Bandaranaike was himself a fully paid-up member of that elite re-
veals some of the futility in this move. But when Bandaranaike
himself was assassinated by a monk the public mood turned
against the order of monks (the sangha) in general, and against
their public involvement in politics in particular. Or so I was told
by monks I interviewed in the early 1980s.
Nevertheless, the new constitution that was adopted in 1972
with the renaming of Ceylon as Sri Lanka, gave Buddhism a privi-
leged status in the country, and everyday political life involved reg-
ular displays of deference to Buddhism, as senior political ﬁgures
paid well-publicized visits to Buddhist monks to consult on affairs
of state, and competed to associate themselves publicly with dis-
plays of state support for the sangha. The order of things was dis-
played at all the political rallies I attended at the time. There
would always be a phalanx of monks on the platform with the
speakers, but they usually played no role in the argy-bargy of the
meeting itself, their presence instead a symbolic sine qua non for
the regular conduct of the political: in their passive presence, they
represented the unity of the nation, the special place of Sri Lanka
for Buddhism, the central role of Sinhala Buddhists as the true
owners of the nation. The only exception to this pattern I wit-
nessed during my period as a documenter of Sri Lankan elections
in the early 1980s, was the indecorous monk who got embroiled
with the drunk at the village rally in my opening example.
He had a history. Indeed he was often referred to by my friends,
not by his full monastic name, but by the simple oxymoron ‘trouble
monk’ (karadara hamuduruvo) and that’s how I ﬁnd him often re-
ferred to in my ﬁeldnotes from this time. (An oxymoron because
a monk is by his very nature expected to embody a certain calm
and to display an unfaltering emotional control in his public
appearances. The word karadara is an antonym for all of that.) This
monk had in the 1970s led a local campaign backing Buddhist
claims to the site of a nationally famous local Muslim (Suﬁ) shrine.
In 1983, some months after the events I related here, the MP’s fa-
vored candidates were defeated in local council elections in the
nearest town, producing scenes of wild abandon which culminated
in the MP himself shooting a pistol into air to disperse a crowd that
had gathered outside his bungalow to taunt him. On this occasion,
the trouble monk was said – in rather hushed whispers, in my
experience – to have been seen dancing in the street. But of course
the very tone in which I was told of these doings conveyed a strong
sense that his over-enthusiastic public engagement in the political
was somehow transgressive. The monk was a man of intelligence
and learning, I was told, but. . . somehow all this stuff had leftThere is a long, and often quite incisive, literature on the religion-politics nexus in
Sri Lanka. Much of the best research concentrates on Buddhism (e.g. Abeysekera,
2002; Seneviratne, 1999) as might be expected, but Stirrat’s (1992) work on
Catholicism raises important issues that apply across the range of religious traditions
on the island.
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of the problematic role he had made for himself: the one time I had
actually heard him speak at a public rally earlier in the election
campaign most of what he said took the form of a justiﬁcation of
his right to intervene in the space of the political, a right justiﬁed
in his argument, by the threats the current government posed to
the unity and dignity of the nation as a whole. In other words,
his political presence had to be justiﬁed in a language that could
be felt to transcend the petty divisions of the world of politics.
So in the modus vivendi of the early 1980s, the presence of the
sangha was at once indispensable yet highly constrained – indis-
pensable as a passive presence at mainstream political rallies in
the South of the island, constrained by the knowledge that more
active participation in public politics threatened to undermine
the authority it commanded as a symbol of the nation’s unity
and destiny. It was, as I said, unstable. In the mid 1980s, monks be-
came for a time the targets for attacks and massacres by the sepa-
ratists of the LTTE. In the protests that followed the Indian
intervention in 1987, monks, especially younger monks, were very
visibly engaged. In the insurrection that followed many, on both
the government and anti-government sides, were attacked and
killed. Transgression piled upon transgression. Some of the history
of the unstable relationship between ‘religion’ and ‘politics’ has
been very ably documented by Ananda Abeysekera in his mono-
graph Colors of the Robe (2002). Abeysekera does not, however,
document more recent developments like the rise to prominence
around the turn of the millennium of the militant monk (and TV
personality) Reverend Gangodawila Soma, whose death in myste-
rious circumstances in late 2003 sparked attacks on Christian
churches and became the subject of a million lurid conspiracy the-
ories (Berkwitz, 2008), or the formation in the immediate wake of
his death of a new ultra-nationalist political party, the Jathika Hela
Urumaya which brought nine monks into parliament in the elec-
tions of 2004 (Deegalle, 2004). Somehow these ﬁgures could just
about be ﬁtted within the broad structure of feeling of the early
1980s: their political platform was highly nationalistic, supportive
of a military rather than a political solution to the ethnic conﬂict,
and claiming (however successfully or unsuccessfully) to be speak-
ing from a space somewhere beyond the grubby divisions of poli-
tics-as-usual. That claim, to put it mildly, has not gone
uncontested, and there is widespread disquiet about the role and
conduct of the monk-MPs, outside the immediate social base of
the party in Colombo’s nervous post-liberalization middle class.
Much more could be said about the boundary between Buddhism
and the political in Sri Lanka, especially its porosity and instability
in recent years, but the point for present purposes is simple: very
few people, either monks or laypeople, thought there should be
no boundary at all however much they disagreed about where
the boundary should properly lie, or what did or did not constitute
‘political’ involvement on the part of monks.
The relationship between Islam and the political in Sri Lanka is
far less well documented and analyzed, and what follows is neces-
sarily more sketchy and provisional.7 One place to start is with a
heuristic distinction between mobilization around Muslim identity
and mobilization around what we might call an Islamist religious
project. The former has a history stretching back to the 19th century
in Sri Lanka, the latter remains more or less invisible in national pol-
itics to this day. Muslims are sometimes spoken of as Sri Lanka’s ‘for-
gotten minority’. They constitute 8% of the population, mostly Tamil7 For useful recent overviews of the Muslim political situation see Lewer and Ismail
(2010) and McGilvray and Raheem (2007), and speciﬁcally Klem (2011) and
Hasbullah and Korf (forthcoming). Although the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress was
founded as a Muslim political party, in practice it has not functioned as an obviously
Islamist party: its main concerns have been Muslim identity politics rather than
Islamic social issues.speakers, with signiﬁcant concentrations in towns across the island,
and along the densely populated stretch of the East coast south of
Batticaloa, where the population is pretty evenly divided between
Muslims and Tamils. In the late 19th century Muslim leaders suc-
cessfully lobbied the colonial government for recognition as an ‘eth-
nologically’ distinct group (‘race’ in the language of the times) which
required its own political representatives (Ismail, 1995). Until
the mid 1980s, Muslim politicians worked within the structures of
the two main national parties, the UNP and SLFP. In areas where
Muslims were a minority, but could mobilize as a block vote, they
could form alliances with one or other of the mainstream parties
to get Muslims elected to Parliament. These Muslim parliamentari-
ans avoided the call to separatism, and found themselves rather
patronizingly characterized by conservative commentators as a
‘model minority’, in contrast to the disaffected and unruly Tamils
(e.g. De Silva, 1986).
The strategic position of Muslim politicians in predominantly
Sinhala electorates changed with the introduction of proportional
representation in the 1980s, but the bigger factor was of course
the drift into civil war. After the anti-Tamil riots of 1983 all minor-
ities felt their place in Sri Lanka threatened, and many young Tamil
men joined up with the militant groups, which at that point were
still relatively diverse in their organizations and ideology. In the
East of the country some young Muslim men also joined the locally
dominant militant group, the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Libera-
tion Front (EPRLF), but this display of local Tamil-Muslim solidarity
fell apart in murky and rather violent circumstances in 1985. By
the early 1990s, when the LTTE had established itself as a control-
ling force in the Tamil areas of the East, Tamil-Muslim relations
had badly deteriorated. The massacre at Kattankudy in August
1990 was one of the worst examples of that deterioration. Two
months later, the LTTE ordered the entire Muslim population of
the Jaffna peninsula in the north to leave, with over 70,000 refu-
gees forced to ﬂee with whatever they could carry on foot from
their homes. This is the context in which new Muslim political for-
mations started to emerge.
Before the 1980s, Muslim political leadership in Sri Lanka
tended to be based in Colombo, even though it tried at times to
speak on behalf of the big concentrations of Muslim population
in the East of the country. As ‘‘the conﬂict’’ in general put most
pressure on Muslims living in the East (and North), so the East be-
came the source of new leaders and new parties. The most impor-
tant ﬁgure in this transition was MHM Ashraff, a charismatic
lawyer and politician from the East, who founded the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress in the early 1980s, and entered Parliament later
in that decade. Ashraff served as a Minister in the coalition lead
by Chandrika Kumaratunga in the 1990s before dying in mysteri-
ous circumstances in a helicopter crash in 2000. After his death,
his party split into various factions, each lead by different political
‘‘big men’’ (at least one of whom was a woman – Ashraff’s widow).
The story is complex and highly contested so this is not in-
tended to be at all deﬁnitive. In its early stages, Ashraff himself ap-
pears as a kind of chameleon, making a name for himself as a
student in the Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami, then appearing as a dele-
gate at the 1976 Vaddukkoddai conference which brought together
a number of Tamil opposition parties under the call to establish a
separate state of Tamil Eelam, then working for the ﬂedgling Mus-
lim Congress. Here are parts of a version of it I was told (with fel-
low researchers Klem and Hasbullah) by a long-time activist from
the town of Akkaraipattu, who had been involved with the Muslim
Congress from the very start. He tells the tale of Ashraff’s SLMC and
the rise of the Mosque Federations as a single narrative. The key
dates in the narrative are 1983, 1985, 1990 and 2002. The SLMC
in its earliest days was primarily a youth organization, organized
as he put it, for both security and social reasons. In 1983, after
the government-backed attacks on Tamils in Colombo and
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started to mobilize youth in this part of the East, and at ﬁrst a num-
ber of young Muslim men joined them. Muslims had no separate
representation as Muslims in the all-party conference summoned
by the government after the 1983 violence, and as the SLMC took
up the political challenge in the name of Eastern Muslims, so the
new Mosque Federations started to organize at village level. One
of the concerns for the Federation’s founders was the need to keep
‘‘their’’ youth out of the hands of the militants. A series of clashes
between Tamil militants and Muslims in 1985, which set in motion
the polarization of the two groups for the next two decades, took
care of that problem. To some extent, a division of labor emerged
in which Muslim politicians looked after Muslim interests in the
realm of national politics, while the mosque organizations dealt
with religious and ‘‘social’’ issues. With each twist and turn of
the conﬂict, the Mosque Federations grew in strength. In 2002 with
a bilateral ceaseﬁre between the government and the LTTE (and no
place at the table for the Muslims), the LTTE took on increasingly
visible policing functions in the areas under their control. The Mos-
que Federations responded by urging ‘‘their’’ people to bring issues
to them, not to the LTTE, and by uniting different town-based Fed-
erations at District level. What is important about this version of
local history, is the way in which the activist at once stresses the
coevality of the Muslim Congress and the Mosque Federations,
both born of the troubles of the 1980s, and their striking diver-
gence over subsequent decades.8
All this can be contrasted with the situation described by Den-
nis McGilvray in his recent ethnography of Tamils and Muslims in
this part of Sri Lanka. Although, McGilvray surveys the wreckage of
the 25 years of war in the closing chapters of the book, the bulk of
his account draws on his ﬁeldwork in the 1970s. In a few pages
(2008, pp. 275–279) he charts there the declining importance at
that time of the mosque trustees as a political force in the town
of Akkaraipattu. Disputes which once had been referred to them
were now resolved in other, apparently more effective, arenas.
McGilvray describes a key event in the decline of trustee authority,
in 1965 they had attempted to coerce the Muslim population to
back a local candidate in the general election, but their threat of
sanctions against supporters of the other candidate only brought
derision on them. They tried to stay out of the next election, in
1970, which brought violence and trouble between rival support-
ers in its wake, and when they failed to intervene in that violence,
they were again criticized.
So, at the risk of simplifying a very complex history, we can ven-
ture a couple of tentative conclusions. One is that the relationship
between the space of politics and the space of religion has been
tense and contested for a long time – certainly back to the
1960s, and probably further. The second is that ‘‘the conﬂict’’ has
paradoxically served to strengthen both the political and the reli-
gious. The threat, initially posed by Sinhala chauvinists close to
the government in 1983, but latterly by the LTTE, had produced
new Muslim organizations and strengthened a new Muslim polit-
ical leadership. But at the same time, it had also opened up a reju-
venated space for self-organization at the level of the mosque and
the community. Although the new political forces and the new reli-
gious civil society were coeval, and had been the work of the same
cohort of actors responding to the same external challenges at the
start, little by little they had drifted apart. The politicians, we were
told back in that meeting at Kattankudy, were necessary to look
after our interests, but they were also divisive. Community8 In practice the boundary between the politicians and the Mosque Federations is
very far from absolute; what is important here is its normative importance, the
general sense that there needs to be some sort of boundary if the community
organizations are to work successfully. In this respect there are obvious parallels with
Buddhist boundaries between politics and the sangha.self-organization had gained legitimacy through the years of con-
ﬂict, but only to the extent that it did not get neatly identiﬁed with
the working of the political.5. Agonism and community
Let me brieﬂy return to Schmitt and Mouffe. I have found Mou-
ffe’s interpretation of Schmitt very useful to think with, but would
be the ﬁrst to acknowledge my position as a reluctant, and
undoubtedly ‘‘vulgar’’ (to use Meyer et al.’s [2012] term) Schmit-
tian. My problem has been ﬁrst of all empirical: how to capture
the aesthetic richness of the kinds of politics I ﬁrst encountered
in Sri Lanka in the early 1980s. Working, as they seemed to, in mul-
tiple registers – comic and tragic, enthralling and appalling, ludic
and frightening – they seemed to defy easy reduction to issues of
power and resistance, still less the rational instrumentalism of con-
ventional political anthropology (Spencer, 2007). Agonism seemed
a constant in people’s apprehension of the political, so Schmitt’s
friend-enemy distinction struck me from the start as almost self-
evident as a useful point of departure. It also retains something
of the moral disturbance – the capacity to shock and unhinge –
which is so central to the Sri Lankan sense of the political. But
the full perspective of Schmitt’s intellectual landscape (as sketched
adeptly elsewhere in this issue [Meyer et al., 2012]) does not ap-
peal, and I feel no need to apologize for ignoring this.
One advantage in using an eviscerated Schmitt is the ability to
shed the immediate political context, and the disturbing political
implications, of his most celebrated work. For Chantal Mouffe
(2000), writing not in the closing years of the Weimar republic,
but in the heyday of the Blair-Giddens ‘‘Third Way’’, with its cele-
bration of post-ideological consensus, Schmitt’s ‘agonism’ is a nec-
essary source of political vitality.9 Mouffe emphasizes the agonistic
core of democracy, the need for adversarial positions, and the ways
in which the workings of power constitute the very identities around
which political competition works. Seen like this, in Sri Lanka the
years of ‘‘the conﬂict’’ are themselves years in which the friend-en-
emy distinction dominates, not in terms of adversarial politics, but in
terms of the blunt pitting of community against community, Tamil
versus Muslim, or community against the state, LTTE versus the Gov-
ernment of Sri Lanka.
In Mouffe’s terms, the new forms of Muslim political and social
organization I have described, might be seen as evidence of the
constitutive effect of the political in the politics of identity. But is
there not a qualitative difference between the political work of a
ﬁgure like Ashraff, and the open war that is ‘‘the conﬂict’’? This
is a difﬁcult question to resolve. In terms of the contemporary
scene, Muslim politicians in the East, like pretty much all politi-
cians in the island, retain their private bands of ‘‘thugs’’ and em-
ploy them when necessary. The Government in 2008 ﬁtted out a
ragtag band of ex-LTTE ﬁghters in suits and ties and installed them
as the new duly elected local government in the area. (Everyone as-
sumes this group was the source of the most recent grenade attack
on the Kattankudy mosques.) The violence of ‘‘the conﬂict’’ and the
violence of politics-as-normal look to be continuous rather than
discontinuous. But the productive effect of the conﬂict produces
expressions of identity that work in different registers. In the polit-
ical register itself it produces politicians who are themselves per-
fectly capable of meeting violence with violence if that should
prove necessary. But in the register of community, that propensity
to violence is at once necessary but also quite problematic. Here9 There is, though, a question to be resolved about how far one can domesticate a
thinker like Schmitt without fatally diluting whatever insights he originally had to
offer. Mouffe’s (2000) distinction between ‘antagonism’ (a potentially destructive
relation between enemies) and ‘agonism’ (a relation between adversaries) can be read
as a move towards a liberal domestication of the Schmittian axiom.
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evening’s discussion at the Mosque Federation, an evening which
started with the claim that the local politicians defer to the com-
munity’s wishes as expressed by the Federation, and ends with
the admission that the Federation retains its authority to the ex-
tent that it keeps the same politicians out of its affairs as much
as it can.
But what of community then? I have taken my argument this
far without referring to ‘secularism’, or to relations between reli-
gion and the state, but my references to the register of community
echo an interesting recent argument from India. In the mid 1990s
Partha Chatterjee (1994 [1995]), wrote a very interesting essay in
response to the issues raised in the so-called Shah Bano case. The
case, which went to the Supreme Court in India, concerned a mid-
dle-aged woman who had been rejected by her husband, who re-
fused to pay any maintenance, citing Muslim family law in his
support. The ex-wife instead took refuge in a piece of colonial leg-
islation, the Vagrancy Act, in order to force support from ex-hus-
band. The case hinged on the state’s recognition of different legal
codes for different religiously based communities. Its celebrity
owed something to the way in which it disturbed familiar political
alignments, with hard-line Hindu nationalists arguing for a uni-
form legal code across all communities, and citing women’s rights
in their support, and the left forced to take a softer position to-
wards Muslim family law in pursuit of what they saw as a politics
of tolerance.
Chatterjee’s essay, which originally appeared in India in 1994,
had two parts. The ﬁrst reviewed the history of the Indian state’s
engagement with public religion and showed that whatever else
it meant in the subcontinent, ‘secularism’ did not involve any obvi-
ous boundary between the state and religious institutions. The sec-
ond part of the essay concerned the idea of the religious
community as a collective actor, whose rights included inter alia
the right to refuse any engagement with the state and its claims.
In support of this argument, he sketched a model of religious com-
munity which is of some relevance to this case. He posited a hypo-
thetical position – a woman drawn between the claims of the state
and the claims of community – and suggested a model of action
which addressed issues of justice and democracy within the com-
munity while simultaneously rejecting the claims of the state:
[O]ur protagonist will try to engage in a strategic politics that is
neither integrationist not separatist. She will, in fact locate her-
self precisely at the cusp where she can face, on the one side,
the assimilationist powers of governmental technology and
resist, on the grounds of autonomy and self-representation, its
universalist ideas of citizenship and, on the other side, struggle,
once again on the grounds of autonomy and self-representation,
for the emergence of more representative public institutions
within her community. (Chatterjee, 1995, p. 37)10 My critique of Mouffe resonates with others within geography, who have found
Mouffe’s conception of the political problematic (e.g. Featherstone, 2008; Barnett,
2004; Slater, 2002 and of course, Massey, 1995).
11 The desire to extend the domain of the political as wide as imagination allows is a
feature of much recent political anthropology, but it is not necessarily a desire shared
by the people we write about (see Curtis and Spencer (2012) for a fuller review of this
trend and its implications).It was the idea of ‘‘representative public institutions within her
community’’ that brought this essay to mind when I started to
think through the implications of our evening with the Kattankudy
Mosque Federation. Here were what appeared to be ‘‘representa-
tive public institutions’’. What can my case tell us about commu-
nity and the political?
First of all, it makes little sense to approach this in terms of
resistance to the state. The enemy here is not the state as such,
but those armed representatives of the neighboring community
who had, in the recent past, attacked and killed members of this
community. And, if anything, those representative institutions rep-
resented a kind of governmentality-from-below, a set of practices
and goals focused on the creation of a disciplined and modern
community of Muslims, rather than any external governmentality
to be resisted. Crucially, the space that needed overt resistance, we
were told, the practices that needed to be cordoned off, if there wasto be any chance for the blossoming of community, was the space
of the political.
But there is a further paradox, which renders Chatterjee’s model
of community even more compromised. The enemy against which
the Mosque Federation composed itself was not simply the enemy
out there – the Tamil militants with their guns: there were also
enemies within, heterodox Muslims, bad Muslims, Muslims whose
practices or beliefs threatened the purity of the community; and
the community and its representative public institutions had to
deal with them as much as they had to deal with the Tamil mili-
tants. Dealing with heterodoxy had involved the denial of burial
rights within the town to members of certain Suﬁ groups, the
destruction of one group’s headquarters, the occasional shooting,
beating, and yes even a hand grenade or two. The Mosque Federa-
tion was not in itself responsible for these speciﬁc acts of violence,
but they certainly endorsed the community’s right and need to act
in this way to protect its boundaries. In other words, even a body
which explicitly presented itself as operating outside the political,
does not thereby slough off the distinction between friend and en-
emy. If we return to the Schmittian deﬁnition, we ﬁnd the return of
the political, this time in the register of community, with agonism
and amity morphing back and forth into each other like receding
images in a hall of mirrors.6. Conclusion: a space outside the political?
How does all of this bear on the question with which I started,
the relationship between theory-in-general and politics-in-
particular-locations? I noted there that a body of theory criticized
for inattention to empirical process had helped me to illuminate
some very speciﬁc processes in one very particular location: the
Sri Lanka of the 1980s and after. But in order to achieve this
apparently perverse outcome, it was necessary to suspend one
rather crucial dimension of that theory: that dimension is, of
course, the normative. If the people I met and spoke to subscribed
to an understanding of politics as inherently agonistic and divisive,
that was not because they felt that this was how things ought to
be. They did not, so far as I could tell, differentiate between
‘desirable’ (agonistic) and ‘undesirable’ (antagonistic) registers of
the political, as Mouffe tries to do.10 Nor did they think the exten-
sion of politics into other areas of everyday life an inherently good
thing: far from it.11 At the risk of over-simplifying, in what we might
call local normative theory, politics was a source of moral dismay, at
once inescapable and undesirable. To forget or ignore this important
fact is a rather serious dereliction of empirical duty.
I want to close with a ﬁnal paradox, a paradox that refers back
to the purpose of the project from which I have drawn this mate-
rial. It is anticipated in the image in the last section, which reminds
us, it seems, of the inescapable nature of the political. The paradox
is this: one of our intentions when we started our research was to
look for capacities for peace-making in unexpected places,
churches, mosques and temples, which may have been overlooked
in conventional accounts of conﬂict. We did indeed ﬁnd such
capacities. But they seem to have self-imposed limits which seem
somehow perverse in the context of a situation which all parties
agree is attributable in the end to the actions of politics. Religious
actors have important capacities for mediation and conﬂict reduc-
tion, but these capacities depend on preserving an imagined
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ical. They are thus only able to address the consequences of con-
ﬂict, but rarely its causes. Moreover the version of community
built up ‘‘outside’’ the political, generates its own take on the
friend-enemy distinction, its own placing of dissenters outside
the boundary of the real community.
I have been tempted from the start to talk about the political as
over-determining this setting, reappearing even when it seems to
have been deﬁnitively banished. But I am not sure this is the case,
not least because I continue to believe it possible for actors, in that
landscape of checkpoints and bullet-scarred mosques, to ﬁnd ways
to step around the big shapes of friend and enemy. Everyday exam-
ples abound, small accommodations and interdependencies, and as
one activist friend told me – there is always more that people can
do than they realize (Gasbeek, 2010; Walker, 2010). But to do
more, to address the processes which produce and reproduce
‘‘the conﬂict’’, it is in the end necessary to move outside the safe
haven of local community and engage with the world of mass pol-
itics, because it is in that world that the differences between friend
and enemy have been used as the building blocks for whole histo-
ries of enmity, and it will be from that world that one day the ef-
forts will come that will ﬁnally break – for now – those histories
and their sense of inevitability.
For now, though, the story in these places has moved on. The
2009 victory by the government in their long struggle with the
LTTE has been followed by two rounds of elections in which an
authoritarian and majoritarian regime has successfully trounced
its slow-footed opponents. Dazzled by their own success, there is
a clear expectation expressed in government circles that the coun-
try has now moved beyond the reversals and argy-bargy that have
hitherto made up the political in post-Independence Sri Lanka.
With staggering tales of corruption circulating (but rarely in the
country’s battered and cowed press), and the government appar-
ently buying into reports of its own omnipotence, it would seem
to be the end of history all over again: but this time an end not oc-
casioned by an excess of liberalism, but by its opposite. I am not so
sure. Out in Kattankudy, and the many other places like and unlike
Kattankudy across the island, the agonism is still there, morphing
into new shapes, new enemies replace the old enemies, and new
solidarities will yet emerge to challenge the powers-that-be.
References
Abeysekera, A., 2002. Colors of the Robe: Religion, Identity, and Difference.
University of South Carolina Press, Columbia.
Barnett, C., 2004. Deconstructing radical democracy: articulation, representation,
and being-with-others. Political Geography 23 (5), 503–518.
Barnett, C., 2012. Situating the geographies of injustice in democratic theory.
Geoforum. Space, Contestation and the Political (Special Issue).Berkwitz, S., 2008. Resisting the global in Buddhist nationalism: venerable soma’s
discourse of decline and reform. Journal of Asian Studies 67 (1), 73–106.
Chatterjee, P., 1995. Religious minorities and the secular state. Public Culture 18,
11–39.
Curtis, J., Spencer, J., 2012. Anthropology and the political. In: Fardon, R. et al. (Eds.),
The Sage Handbook of Social Anthropology, vol. 1. Sage, London.
De Silva, K.M., 1986. Managing Ethnic Tensions in Multi Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka
1880–1985. University Press of America, Lanham, Md.
Deegalle, M., 2004. Politics of the Jathika Hela Urumaya Monks: Buddhism and
ethnicity in contemporary Sri Lanka. Contemporary Buddhism 5 (2), 83–103.
Featherstone, D., 2008. Resistance, Space and Political Identities: The Making of
Counter-global Networks. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford.
Gasbeek, T., 2010. Bridging Troubled Waters? Everyday Inter-ethnic Interaction in a
Context of Violent Conﬂict in Kottiyar Pattu, Trincomalee, Sri Lanka. PhD Thesis,
Wageningen University.
Geertz, C., 2000. The world in pieces: culture and politics at the end of the century.
In: Geertz, C. (Ed.), Available Light: Anthropological Reﬂections on Philosophical
Topics. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Goodhand, J., Klem, B., Korf, B., 2009. Religion, conﬂict and boundary politics in Sri
Lanka. European Journal of Development Research 21, 679–698.
Hasbullah, S.H., Korf, B., forthcoming. Muslim geographies, violence and the
antinomies of community in eastern Sri Lanka. Geographical Journal.
Ismail, Q., 1995. Unmooring identity: the antinomies of elite Muslim self-
representation in modern Sri Lanka. In: Jeganathan, P., Ismail, Q. (Eds.),
Unmaking the Nation: The Politics of Identity and History in Modern Sri
Lanka. Social Scientists’ Association, Colombo.
Klem, B., 2011. Islam, politics and violence in eastern Sri Lanka. Journal of Asian
Studies 70 (3), 730–753.
Lewer, N., Ismail, M., 2010. The genealogy of Muslim political voices in Sri Lanka. In:
Goodhand, J., Korf, B., Spencer, J. (Eds.), Aid, Conﬂict and Peacebuilding in Sri
Lanka, Caught in the Peace Trap. Routledge, London.
Massey, D., 1995. Thinking radical democracy spatially. Environment and Planning
D: Society and Space. 13 (3), 283–288.
McGilvray, D., Raheem, M., 2007. Muslim Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conﬂict.
Policy Studies Papers, 41. East-West Center, Washington.
McGilvray, D., 2008. Crucible of Conﬂict: Tamil and Muslim Society on the East
Coast of Sri Lanka. Duke University Press, Durham, NC.
Meyer, R., Schetter, C., Prinz, J., 2012. Spatial Contestation? The theological
foundations of Carl Schmitt’s spatial thought. Geoforum. Space, Contestation
and the Political (Special Issue). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2011.
06.004>.
Mouffe, C., 2000. The Democratic Paradox. Verso, London.
Schmitt, C., 1996. The Concept of the Political. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Seneviratne, H.L., 1999. The Work of Kings: The New Buddhism in Sri Lanka.
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Slater, D., 2002. Other domains of democratic theory: space, power, and the politics
of democratization. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 20 (3),
255–276.
Spencer, J., 1990. A Sinhala Village in a Time of Trouble: Politics and Change in Rural
Sri Lanka. Oxford University Press, Delhi.
Spencer, J., 2007. Anthropology, Politics and the State: Democracy and Violence in
South Asia. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Spencer, J., 2010. Reﬂections on an illiberal peace. Stories from the east. In:
Goodhand, J., Korf, B., Spencer, J. (Eds.), Aid, Conﬂict and Peacebuilding in Sri
Lanka, Caught in the Peace Trap. Routledge, London.
Spencer, J., Goodhand, J., Hasbullah, S., et al., in preparation. Checkpoint, Temple,
Church and Mosque: A Collaborative Ethnography of War and Peace. Pluto,
London.
Stirrat, J., 1992. Power and Religiosity in a Post-Colonial Setting: Sinhala Catholics in
Contemporary Sri Lanka. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Walker, R., 2010. Violence, the Everyday, and the Question of the Ordinary.
Contemporary South Asia 18 (1), 9–24.
